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Victoria Saxe

Junk Evidence: A Call to Scrutinize Historical Cell Site
Location Evidence
19 U.N.H. L. Rev. 133 (2020)

Historical cell site location information (CSLI) has been offered as objective,
scientific location evidence in criminal trials, but is far less precise than the claims it is used to
support. Not only is there no way to pinpoint a cellphone’s precise geographic location from
historical CSLI, but there are also no known validation or error rates for the methodologies used
to collect and analyze this data. A 2019 telecommunications scandal in Denmark revealed gross
inadequacies in the cellphone data and software used by law enforcement to analyze this type of
evidence. The scandal sent shockwaves through the country’s legal community and led to a
temporary moratorium on the use of cellphone location evidence, a comprehensive investigation
into data collection and analysis practices, and the adoption of extensive reform and
improvement measures. Perhaps even more importantly, the scandal undercut the trust and
acceptance previously afforded to this type of evidence. Taking from the lessons learned in
Denmark, this Note attempts to lay out what is known and unknown about historical CSLI and
how the current state of this type of evidence comports with the Federal Rules of Evidence. In
Part I, this Note first examines how and why historical CSLI is produced. Part II summarizes the
current known issues with this type of cellphone location evidence. Finally, Part III sets forth the
evidentiary shortcomings of historical CSLI that may be raised in criminal trials.
ABSTRACT.

University of New Hampshire School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2021. Sincerest thanks
to Professor Buzz Scherr for his “annoying and supportive” guidance throughout the writing
process and to The University of New Hampshire Law Review staff for their diligent review and helpful
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I N T R OD U C T I ON

In June 2019, authorities in Denmark discovered errors in the way cellphone
location data had been used in criminal trials in the country beginning in 2012.1
Among the errors found, officials discovered that a flaw in the software used by
police to analyze cellphone evidence omitted key location data collected by phone
companies and linked phones to incorrect cellphone towers. 2 This meant that
cellphones were sometimes linked to towers located hundreds of miles away from
where the phone was at the time of the call.3 Denmark’s “telecommunications data
scandal” shook the country’s trust in its legal system and led to the review of over
10,000 court verdicts, the release of 32 prisoners, and a two-month ban on the use
of cellphone location data in criminal trials.4 When announcing this response to
the discovered errors, Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions explained, “[w]e
simply cannot live with the idea that information that isn’t accurate could send
people to prison.”5
Denmark’s telecommunications scandal prompted an external investigation
into its use of cellphone location data. 6 This led the national police to adopt an
entirely new infrastructure for handling cellphone data and implement routine
independent quality control and data validation. 7 It also prompted Norway to
investigate its own use of cellphone location data.8
1

IT-Pol, Danish Data Retention: Back to Normal After Major Crisis, European Digital Rights
(Nov. 6, 2019), https://edri.org/danish-data-retention-back-to-normal-after-major-crisis/ [https:
//perma.cc/BD4Z-KNXT].

2

Louise Dalsgaard & Emma Toft, Understand the Mistakes in the Telecommunications Scandal:
Telephone Was in Copenhagen and Frederikshavn at the Same Time, Danish Broad. Corp. (Aug. 31,
2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/forstaa-fejlene-i-teleskandalen-telefon-vari-koebenhavn-og-frederikshavn-paa-samme, [https://perma.cc/CR7H-5HJD].

3

4

Id.

Jon Henley, Denmark Frees 32 Inmates Over Flaws in Phone Geolocation Evidence, Guardian
(Sep. 12, 2019 6:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/12/denmark-frees-32inmates-over-flawed-geolocation-revelations [https://perma.cc/TKP3-YRH9]; Martin Selsoe
Sorensen, Flaws in Cellphone Evidence Prompt Evidence of 10,000 Verdicts in Denmark, N.Y. Times
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/world/europe/denmark-cellphone-datacourts.html [https://perma.cc/AGE6-3Z2F].

5

Henley, supra note 4.

6

IT-Pol, supra note 1.

7

Id.

8

Associated Press, Norway to Review Criminal Cases with Danish Telecom Data, Fed. News
Network (Aug. 29, 2019, 5:37 AM) https://federalnewsnetwork.com/world-news/2019/
08/norway-to-probe-criminal-cases-with-danish-telecom-data/ [https://perma.cc/T2SR-U2GA].
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The Denmark scandal underscores what critics have been saying about
cellphone location evidence for years: using cellphone records to prove a criminal
defendant’s physical location is junk science.9 Yet, cellphone location evidence is
used in tens of thousands of criminal cases in the United States each year.10 In
Denmark, the country’s mindset about cellphone data has changed.11 This scandal
– along with our understanding of the imprecision of cellphone location data, the
unknown reliability of the methods used to collect and analyze this data, and the
risk that juries will overvalue the accuracy of this evidence – should not be ignored.
No country should be comfortable with the idea that inaccurate evidence could send
people to prison.
I.

U N D E R S T A N D I N G H I S T OR I C A L C S L I & I T S L I MI T A T I ON S

Nearly 96% of Americans owned a cellphone in 2019. 12 The vast majority of
cellphone owners frequently carry their phones with them, and most never or rarely
turn their phones off. 13 Each day, the average cellphone user both makes and
receives six phone calls and 32 text messages.14 Even the Supreme Court has had
9

See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Prosecutors’ use of mobile phone tracking is ‘junk science,’ critics say, ABA J.

(June 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/prosecutors_use_of
_mobile_phone_tracking_is_junk_science_critics_say [https://perma.cc/RPY2-EVEY]; Jeff Chinn,
Mobile Phone Tracking = Junk Science? California Innocence Project, Jun. 4, 2013,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/2013/06/mobile-phone-tracking-junk-science/
[https://perma.cc/TL96-P7TA].
10

Albert Fox Cahn, Phone Tracking Data is Notoriously Unreliable. So Why Are We Still Using it in
Court?, Daily Beast (Sep. 16, 2019 5:24 AM) https://www.thedailybeast.com/denmarksgeolocation-data-crisis-could-prompt-a-reckoning-in-the-us-criminal-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/3GS7-TURQ].

11

Henley, supra note 4 (quoting Karoline Normann, Head of the Danish Law Society’s Criminal
Law Committee) (“This situation has changed our mindset about cellphone data. We are probably
going to question it as we normally question a witness or other types of evidence, where we
consider who produced the evidence, and why and how.”)

12

Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet
/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/8T84-KQEX].

13

Lee Rainie & Kathryn Zickuhr, Chapter 1: Always on Connectivity, Americans’ Views on Mobile
Etiquette, Pew Res. Ctr. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/08/26/
chapter-1-always-on-connectivity/ [https://perma.cc/A2JL-JRNA].

14

No Time to Talk: Americans Sending/Receiving Five Times as Many Texts Compared to Phone Calls
Each Day, According to New Report, PR Newswire (Mar. 25, 2015, 1:40 PM), https://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/no-time-to-talk-americans-sendingreceiving-five-times-asmany-texts-compared-to-phone-calls-each-day-according-to-new-report-300056023.html
[https://perma.cc/LM9J-GS4Q].
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occasion to note that “modern cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent
part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.”15
The prevalence of cellphone use and advancements in phone technology have
made cellphones a growing source of evidence in criminal cases.16 Evidence from
cellphones can take many forms – including information like text messages, photos,
and e-mail, as well as billing records of phone activity and use. 17 Frequently,
cellphones are used to provide crucial evidence in criminal cases to place a
defendant at the time and place of a crime.18
The three most common ways cellphones are used to determine location are
through Global Positioning System (GPS) technology; triangulation, a process used
to estimate the location of a phone based on the cell tower locations of where its
signal registers; and analyzing historical cell site location information or CSLI from
a cellphone user’s call records. 19 Though GPS and triangulation are considered
quite accurate in determining a cellphone’s location, both methods typically require
collecting information in real time.20 Given the practical reality that most crimes
are investigated after the fact, law enforcement frequently relies on historical CSLI,
“the least accurate method of tracking a cell phone,” to hypothesize a defendant’s
location when the alleged crime occurred.21 This Note considers CSLI – the use and
analysis of cellphone call detail records and historical cell site location information
– evidence which “is fraught with potential misunderstandings by courts and juries
alike.”22
15

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (holding that a search warrant is required to search
a cellphone even when phones are seized incident to arrest).

16

Larry E. Daniel & Lars E. Daniel, Digital Forensics for Legal Professionals:
Understanding Digital Evidence from the Warrant to the Courtroom 263 (Robert
Maxwell & Sue Spielman eds., 2012).

17

Id. at 19.

18

John B. Minor, Forensic Cell Site Analysis: A Validation & Error Mitigation Methodology, 12 J. DIGIT.
Forensics, Security & L. 33, 34 (2017).

19

Thomas J. Kirkham, Comment, Rejecting Historical Cell Site Location Information as Unreliable
Under Daubert and Rule 702, 50 U. Tol. L. Rev. 361, 372 (2019); Rajiv Netra, How GPS, Cell Tower and
Wi-Fi Triangulation Help in Tracking Location?, Safetrax (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.safetrax.in/
2017/09/05/gps-cell-tower-triangulation-help-tracking-location/ [https://perma.cc/HUA8-WN7
X].

20

Kirkham, supra note 19, at 373. The privacy and Fourth Amendment implications of real-time
GPS and triangulation tracking are not addressed in this Note.

21

Id. at 361–62.

22

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 225.
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A. How Cellphones Operate in Cellular Networks
Cellphones work by sending and receiving radio signals between the phone’s
internal antennas and cell towers. 23 Cell towers are one part of the system of
equipment and technology that facilitates cellular networks. 24 This system also
includes transceiver stations, located at the base of every cell tower, which connect
the radio signals from cellphones to radio network controllers, and mobile
switching centers, which connect to all of the cell towers in a coverage area.25 Every
communication from a cellphone is routed through a mobile switching center and
then onto the other phone with which it is communicating.26
When a cellphone is first turned on, it attempts to “register” with a cellular
network by sending a radio signal to the cell tower with the strongest signal.27 There
are hundreds of thousands of cell towers (also known as cell sites) in the United
States – ranging from the tall, metal radio tower masts to antennas on raised
structures like rooftops and billboards.28 Given the large number of cell tower sites,
a cellphone is usually no more than a few miles from a tower that it can connect to.29
However, depending on the capabilities of the phone, internal cellphone antennas
have the capacity to send radio signals to towers several miles away, potentially up
to over 20 miles.30
Cell towers typically provide coverage to circular areas with a few-miles’ radius,

23

Id. at 229–30.

24

Id. at 226.

25

Id. at 228.

26

Mobile Switching Center (MSC), Techopedia (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.techopedia.com/
definition/8448/mobile-switching-center-msc [https://perma.cc/443V-UEZA]; Cellular Network,
Techopedia (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.techopedia.com/definition/24962/cellular-network
[https://perma.cc/JZ35-9S8E].

27

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 229.

28

Linda Hardesty, China Tower Counts 1.95M Tower Sites, Dwarfing US Tower Sites, Fierce
Wireless (Oct. 4, 2019 2:42 PM), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/china-tower-counts-195m-tower-sites-dwarfing-us-tower-sites [https://perma.cc/R7HY-8H32]; Cell Tower Industry Facts
& Figures 2016, Vertical Consultants, https://www.celltowerleaseexperts.com/cell-tower-leasenews/cell-tower-industry-facts-figures-2016/ [https://perma.cc/L4AG-M8SN] (last visited Mar. 6,
2020).

29

Bert Markgraf, How Far Can a Cell Tower Be for a Cellphone to Pick Up the Signal? Chron.: Small
Bus., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/far-can-cell-tower-cellphone-pick-up-signal-32124.html
[https://perma.cc/ZR8C-JQ7P] (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).

30

Id.
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but the coverage area can vary in both distance and radius.31 For example, small
towers in office buildings or airports may only have a coverage radius of 250 yards,
while large cell tower structures can cover a range of ten miles or more in rural
settings.32 And although some towers are designed to provide coverage to circular
areas, others are designed to provide coverage in linear areas such as along a stretch
of highway.33 The breadth of coverage areas leads to overlapping zones, meaning in
a given location, a cellphone is usually within the coverage reach of multiple cell
towers.34
It is a common misconception that a cellphone connects to the cell tower
physically closest to it when registering to a cellular network.35 On the contrary,
the cellphone connects to the cell tower emitting the strongest signal.36 Many
factors affect the signal strength between a cellphone and the cell tower it
connects to, including the number of available cell sites, which can be affected by
repairs and maintenance; the technical characteristics of the tower, antenna, and
phone; the weather, topography, and population density of the area; and whether
the phone is being used indoors or outdoors.37 This variability means it is possible
for two cellphones – subscribed to the same cellular provider and in the exact same
location – to place calls at the same time and connect to two different cell towers.38
B. How CSLI is Collected
When a cellphone sends or receives radio signals from a cell tower, the

31

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 226, 233; Mark F. Rewers, How to Find Your Nearest Cell Tower
Locations, Uber Signal (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.ubersignal.com/blog/cell-tower-locations/
[https://perma.cc/HKZ4-4F6P].

32

Michael Harris, How Cell Towers Work, Unison (2011), http://www.unisonsite.com/
pdf/resource-center/How%20Towers%20Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q45C-EYZ4].

33

Kirkham, supra note 19, at 369.

34

Id.

35

Douglas Starr, What Your Cell Phone Can’t Tell the Police, New Yorker (June 26, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-your-cell-phone-cant-tell-the-police
[https://perma.cc/UM9E-SA37].

36

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 229–30.

37

Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to Track the
Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech., Fall 2011, at 1, 7.

38

Tom Jackman, Experts Say Law Enforcement’s Use of Cellphone Records Can be Inaccurate, Wash.
Post (June 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/experts-say-law-enforcements-useof-cellphone-records-can-be-inaccurate/2014/06/27/028be93c-faf3-11e3-932c-0a55b81f48ce_
story.html [https://perma.cc/JB79-AA8M].
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registration “ping” is processed through databases of account user information in
mobile switching centers. 39 As a cellphone signal connects to a cell tower, the
cellular network learns the tower location of the phone and then determines
whether the phone has an active account that can receive and make calls.40 While it
is turned on, a cellphone will continue to periodically ping the tower with the
strongest signal so that it remains registered to the system and can be located for
incoming calls.41 This allows a cellphone to maintain registration to a network or
connection for a call while a person is moving or driving, or while other factors
affecting signal – like weather or cell traffic – fluctuate.42
Cellular network equipment collects user and network information from these
registration pings, including the account, date, time, and tower location receiving
the signal.43 However, because cellphone users are not billed for merely connecting
to a network, cellphone carriers have no use to store the information from these
registration pings beyond a few hours. 44 When a cellphone is used to place or
receive a call or text message, cellular providers record the information collected by
network equipment for customer billing and network monitoring purposes.45 This
“historical” metadata of cell activity, such as phone calls and text messages that pass
through mobile switching centers, are retained by cellular companies for at least 18
months, as opposed to the mere hours the registration pings are stored.46
When requested, cellular companies can generate billing records and CDRs
with various data collected by the company. 47 The contents of CDRs can vary based
on the carrier and the information requested, but typically show “details of the call
such as the origination and destination addresses of the call, the time the call started
and ended, the duration of the call … [and] other billings associated with the call.”48
CDRs also indicate the identification number of the cell tower that the phone

39

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 230.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.; Kirkham, supra note 19, at 372.

45

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 225, 232.

46
47

Id. at 163; see also 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2020).
Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163–65, 232.

48

Monique C.M. Leahy, Telecommunications and Other Litigation: Call Detail Records and Fraud, in
97 Am. Jur. Trials 1 § 1 (2020).
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connected to during the registered activity.49 The information about tower location
contained in CDRs is generally referred to as cell site location information or CSLI.50
CDRs are different from the actual billing statement that a carrier sends to its
customers, which translates the metadata of codes and strings of numbers from
CDRs into readable information about phone activity related to charges based on
the customer’s service plan. 51 When a CDR is requested by an individual or
agency52, cellular providers produce a record showing the requested data fields and
information about how to decipher the included data.53 To illustrate:
The following is a fictitious example of a call detail record:
E00QQ_5E|MTC1TST0000QQ5ESS000007200000084200000065200402292348347787
555891178755577180078759000000000000000634100000155I0N000000081700000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000088400000868
This CDR indicates the date of the call (20040229), the time of the call (2348347, i.e.,
11:48:34.7 pm), the calling number (7875558911), the called number (78755577180), the
carrier identifier (0155), the billable time of the call (00000868, i.e., 868 tenths of seconds
or one minute and 26.8 seconds), and other numbers including the switch name and
trunk group.54

Though the tower location recorded on the CDR merely indicates that the
phone was somewhere within the signal coverage radius of the tower during the
recorded activity, many claims are made as to what police and prosecutors can glean
from the data embedded in CDRs. 55 Indeed, “[a]s early as 1999, cellular carriers
began to produce Call Detail Records (CDR)/Cell Site Location Information (CSLI)
evidence in response to subpoena, search warrants, and court orders.”56 However,
the claims made based on the information in CDRs are frequently “overstated”:
One of the most important things to remember is that a cell phone cannot be located
from a historical call detail record. The best that can be done is that the phone can be
placed in a general area corresponding to a cell tower that was connected to the phone

49

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 232–33.

50

Minor, supra note 18, at 33.

51

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231; Leahy, supra note 48.

52

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) controls disclosure of call detail records
and requires a court order, search warrant, or the subscriber’s consent to release. 18 U.S.C. § 2703
(2019).

53

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 164–64

54

Leahy, supra note 48.

55

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231–32.

56

Minor, supra note 18, at 33.
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at a particular time when a call was made or attempted.57

Moreover, CDRs do not record the other cell towers that the phone was within range
of or how far the cellphone was from the tower associated with the call to allow for
a more precise triangulation of the phone’s location.58 And notably, CDRs cannot
record who used the cellphone to make the registered activity. 59 Though this
information would certainly be helpful evidence in criminal cases, CDRs are merely
records used by cellphone companies “for the purpose of financial transactions such
as generating bills to the subscriber and … settling accounts with other carriers.”60
This is because “the cellular system was not designed to locate cellular phones
beyond simply knowing if a cellphone can be reached to connect a call.”61
Not only do CDRs contain limited information, but the accuracy of the
information they contain is relatively unknown.62 Neither cellular carriers nor the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which maintains cell site licensing
filings, has documented error rates or validation methodologies for CDR or CSLI
records.63 Thus, it is generally unclear how accurate the actual location information
in these records is before it is then subjected to external analysis.64
C. How CSLI is Analyzed
Historical cell site analysis is the process of using cellular network information
to analyze and interpret the recorded cell site location information in CDRs to
approximate a cellphone user’s past location. 65 Historical CSLI cannot be
interpreted from CDRs alone.66 The analysis involves interpreting the data from
CDRs, like the identification numbers of the cell tower locations used by a phone
number at specific times, against additional information from cellphone providers
corresponding to the cell tower identification numbers, like coverage maps,
configurations, and maintenance records for cell towers.67
57

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 231–32.

58

Blank, supra note 37, at 13.

59

Id. at 18.

60

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163.

61

Id. at 225.

62

Minor, supra note 18, at 35.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 34–35.

65

Minor, supra note 18, at 33.

66

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 163–64.

67

Id.
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1.

CSLI Mapping and Software

The primary method of analyzing historical CSLI involves creating maps of cell
site locations showing estimated cell site coverage areas where registered cellular
activity could have occurred. 68 Essentially, analysts compare the times and cell
tower locations recorded in CDRs with records from the cellphone company about
cell tower locations, coverage, and maintenance history.69 The analyst then maps
out the coverage area of the identified cell towers and uses what she knows about
the tower’s configuration and signal to estimate where the registered cellphone
activity could have occurred. 70 Given the amount of interpretation involved,
mapping has “varying levels of accuracy” and “often provid[es] an unreliable
interpretation of the actual evidence.”71
The easiest and most common way CSLI is analyzed is by inputting the data
from CDRs and carrier records into mapping software that generate maps of cell
tower locations and approximate where a cellphone could have connected to a cell
tower during a given call. 72 The availability of mapping software can expedite
analysis of CDR and CSLI data. 73 Law enforcement, for example, often use
commercial software to analyze historical CSLI. 74 One such software company
advertises that it can map up to 4,000 calls in the time it would take to map one call
by hand.75 These programs are also used to generate visual aids and maps at trial.76
But the ability to press an “easy button” and automatically map CSLI means that
individuals conducting historical cell site analysis may only know how to use the
software and may not know how to properly analyze CDRs, interpret carrier
records, or understand the limitations of CSLI the way they would if conducting this
68

Minor, supra note 18, at 33–34.

69

Daniel & Daniel, supra note 16, at 164.

70

Id.

71

Minor, supra note 18, at 33–34.

72

Larry Daniel, et al., Are There Really Flaws in Cell Phone Location Evidence?, Envista Forensics
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.envistaforensics.com/blog/are-there-really-flaws-in-cell-phonelocation-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/Y476-6RD3]. See generally Basic Historical Cell Site Analysis
Course Presented by FBI CAST, Evansville Police (Nov. 2018), http://evansvillepolice.com/sites/
default/files/Basic%20Historical%20Cell%20Site%20Analysis%20Course.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VE5-4CJV].

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Benefits, Hawk Analytics, http://www.hawkanalytics.com/benefits/ [https://perma.cc/
H9U2-5MUF] (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).

76

Id.
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process manually.77
2. Forensic Radio Surveys/Drive Tests
Another method used to analyze historical cell site information involves
conducting a forensic radio survey or “drive test.”78 Drive testing “is a method used
by wireless telephone companies and radio frequency engineers to determine the
coverage range of a cell tower for the purpose of determining the health of the
telephone company’s wireless network.”79 When employed by law enforcement, it
can test whether “at the time of the drive test and in the location of the drive testing
equipment, a phone can make an outgoing call and the phone can ‘hear’ a signal
from a cell tower.”80
The process begins by analyzing the data from CDRs and network information
about the corresponding cell site locations to determine the general area where the
recorded cellular activity could have occurred.81 Then, an analyst drives through the
area while operating mobile receiver equipment to measure the signal strength of
all towers in the area. 82 The results from a drive test can be used to validate
information from a CDR and areas of interest to show “that a cell phone could be at
a particular place and would prefer the cell site and sector that was recorded in the
historical call detail records.”83 Alternatively, drive test results can be used to “create
a map showing the limits of where a cell phone could be and connect to a cell tower
or sector.” 84 However, given all the factors that affect signal strength and the
unlikelihood that the weather and cellular network conditions during the test drive
are identical to those when the cellular activity actually occurred, the reliability of
this methodology is disputed.85

77

Daniel et al., supra note 72.

78

United States v. Morgan, 292 F. Supp. 3d 475, 478–79 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Larry Daniel, Cell
Phone Location Evidence for Legal Professionals: Understanding Cell Phone
Location Evidence from the Warrant to the Courtroom (Academic Press 2017, 1st ed.
2017)).

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Larry Daniel, Cell Phone Location Evidence for Legal Professionals:
Understanding Cell Phone Location Evidence from the Warrant to the Courtroom 76
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I I . P R O B L E MS WI T H H I S T OR I C A L C S L I E V I D E N C E

Forensic cell site analysis is used regularly in criminal cases in the United States
and is viewed as a “primary means of establishing [defendant location] evidence.”86
Though it is often regarded as scientific and objective proof of such evidence, the
accuracy of cell site analysis is highly variable and remarkably unvalidated.87 The
unreliability of this evidence, and consequently the risk of it being overly utilized in
criminal investigations and trials, has caught the attention of courts, 88 legal
scholars,89 and media90.
The criticism of historical cell site location analysis ranges from calls that it is
“junk science” that should be excluded from any use in criminal trials,91 to calls for
ensuring proper use that includes disclaimers of its limitations.92 The consensus
among legal scholars seems to recognize the limitations of historical cellphone
location evidence and to agree that such evidence cannot be used to pinpoint a
phone’s precise location.93 However, as long as this evidence is used in criminal
trials, its limitations and admissibility must be better understood by attorneys,
courts, and juries.
A. Unknown Accuracy of Underlying Data
1.

Call Detail Records

First, historical cell site analysis depends on interpreting data collected by
cellular companies in CDRs and in documentation of network infrastructure,
maintenance, and system performance also produced by cellular companies.94 As
Spec. App. 2017) (reviewing lower court’s conclusion that drive tests were not found to be generally
accepted in the digital forensic science community or subject to peer-review), with United States
v. Morgan, 292 F. Supp. 3d 475, 479 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding the methodology of drive testing to be
generally reliable).
86

Minor, supra note 18, at 34.
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See, e.g., Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Admissibility of Historical Cell Phone Location Evidence, 44 No. 4
Litig. 53 (Summer 2018).
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See, e.g., Kirkham, supra note 19; and Blank, supra note 37.
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See, e.g., Starr, supra note 35; GlobeNewswire, Does Cell Phone Location Data Make for Bad
Evidence? Yahoo! Finance (Feb. 9, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-cell-phonelocation-data-013308219.html, [https://perma.cc/E3CD-FBP8].
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discussed above 95 , these records are collected by cellular companies for billing,
coverage, and analytics purposes, but are routinely used for much graver purposes
against criminal defendants.96 These are clearly incongruent interests in ensuring
the accuracy of the location information collected. Additionally, cellular providers
have never documented error rates or validation methodologies for the following
records regularly used in historical cell site analysis:
1. Carrier cell site location database records.
2. CDR/CSLI records.
3. Documented network infrastructure and operational failures.97
So, the first limitation in forensic cell site analysis is evident before the analysis even
begins: the data that is being analyzed comes from unvalidated records of cellular
network operations and unvalidated information about cell tower locations
collected by phone companies for network billing purposes.98 Practically speaking,
it is uncertain how accurate the data in a CDR is – meaning we do not know whether
cellular systems accurately record the identification number of the cell tower used
to place a call 100% of the time or 99% of the time or less. Currently, law enforcement
and courts rely on the underlying data contained in CDRs as if it is 100% accurate.99
This ignores the possibility for errors in equipment glitches when recording cellular
activity data and in the process of compiling usable data into CDRs.
The possible inaccuracy of CDR data was highlighted in the widely popular 2014
podcast “Serial,” which investigated the 1999 murder of Hae Min Lee in Baltimore,
Maryland, and the ultimate conviction of Lee’s ex-boyfriend Adnan Syed.100 At trial,
cellphone records showing that Syed’s phone pinged a cell tower near the park
where the victim’s body was found “played a significant role in the State’s case and
the jury’s decision-making process.” 101 However, in the wake of the podcast’s
spotlight on the case, it was discovered that a fax cover sheet accompanying the

95

See infra Part I, B.
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Minor, supra note 18, at 33.
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Id. at 35.
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See generally Minor, supra note 18.
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Id. at 35.

100

Justin Fenton & Tim Prudente, Adnan Syed Case: Maryland High Court Reinstates ‘Serial’ Subject’s
Conviction, Balt. Sun (Mar. 8, 2019, 6:15 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-mdci-syed-appeal-20190222-story.html [https://perma.cc/35NN-M9W2].
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Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046, 1, 56 (Balt. Cir. Ct. 2016); Jon Swaine, Serial’s Adnan
Syed: Doubts Over Cellphone Evidence Central to Retrial, Guardian (Jul. 1, 2016, 12:38 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2016/jul/01/serial-adnan-syed-new-trial-hae-minlee-murder [https://perma.cc/G9SA-G8V6].
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“Subscriber Activity Report”102 used at Syed’s trial contained an explicit disclaimer
about the reliability of its cell site location data. 103 The instructions stated:
“Outgoing calls only are reliable for location status. Any incoming calls will NOT be
reliable for location.”104 Presumably, this meant that the carrier’s report generated
cell tower information that did not necessarily correspond with incoming calls. The
need for the disclaimer could have stemmed from unreliable cellular technology or
known errors in the carrier’s system at the time the calls were made.105 In either
event, the disclaimer and the limitation of the location data from the records were
not introduced by the state or challenged by Syed’s defense attorney. 106 Syed’s
initial petition for postconviction relief was granted based on his trial attorney’s
failure to cross-examine the state’s witness about the disclaimer and the reliability
of the relied upon records.107 This decision was ultimately reversed on procedural
grounds.108
2. Cellular Network Records
The second source of underlying data used in historical cell site analysis also
comes from cellular network providers – “cell site location database records” and
“[d]ocumented network infrastructure and operational failures.”109 These records
include the cellular company’s list of cell tower identification numbers and current
locations, the coverage areas and configurations for each tower, and maintenance
records for cell towers and other cellular equipment. 110 This supplemental
information is needed for analysts to interpret the calls and recorded cell tower
102

Though the state attempted to differentiate the term “Subscriber Activity Report” from “call
detail records” to argue the disclaimer did not apply to the document relied on at trial, the
cellphone carrier records at issue contained call activity and cell tower location information in the
way of “call detail records” as discussed by this Note. Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046 at
50–51.
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Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046 at 40.
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See Christina Everett, 5 Key Findings from ‘Undisclosed’ that ‘Serial’ Missed, Entertainment
Weekly (Aug. 24, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://ew.com/article/2015/08/24/5-key-finding-undisclosedserial-adnan-syed/ [https://perma.cc/64VJ-Q3DA] (hypothesizing “[o]ne of the reasons for this
disclaimer was due to a glitch with AT&T at the time, which had incoming calls ping the tower
near the person making the call rather than the person on the receiving end.”).
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Syed v. Maryland, Case No. 199103042-046 at 40.
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Id. at 59.
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number listed in CDRs. 111 Again, cellular companies produce and retain this
information for their own network monitoring and planning and have documented
neither error rates nor validation methodologies for these records.112
One research project found that verifying the geographic cell site locations from
the records produced by cellular carriers can “eliminate[] a substantial percentage
of errors” in cell site analysis.113 In the study, “a cellular carrier produced records in
response to a search warrant that erroneously identified more than 20 cell site
locations within a radius of 2 miles.” 114 Essentially, the cellular carrier provided
incorrect information about the locations of its own cell sites due to documentation
errors in its records of cite installation and equipment upgrades.115
The possibility of inaccurate cellular network records is not hypothetical:
incorrect cell tower location data provided by cellular companies was one of the
issues contributing to Denmark’s telecommunications data scandal.116 Denmark’s
National Police explained the discovery that:
[T]he telecom providers’ mast117 lists have not been correct and continuously updated,
and [] there have therefore been errors in the telecommunications providers’ historical
lists of the telematers’ locations.
This could be, for example, because a telecommunications company has set up
temporary masts due to repairs to existing masts, or because there is a festival in an area
which therefore needs extra masts as there are more people gathered in one place.118

Inaccurate cellular network records compromise the reliability of historical cell site
analysis because “[w]hen cell site locations are not validated[,] the preliminary
analysis mapping risks introduction of false positive indications of the general
location of the [phone].”119 In Denmark, the discovery of this problem led national
police to establish a new collaboration with telecommunication companies to
ensure accuracy in the records they provide police.120 Until such action is taken in
111

Id.

112

Minor, supra note 18, at 35.

113

Id. at 37.
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Id.
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Id.
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Dalsgaard & Togt, supra note 2.
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The term “mast” refers to cellular network antenna equipment, which this Note refers to
generally as “cell towers.” See Kirkham, supra note 19, at 370.
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Minor, supra note 18, at 37.
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the United States, attorneys should be prepared to challenge any cell site analysis
conducted without this crucial validation step.121
B. Cellphones Do Not Always Connect to the Closest Cell Tower
Assuming cellular carrier equipment correctly records the data about a call and
assuming this data is correctly transcribed in a CDR that is analyzed against
accurate cellular network records, this only means that a cellphone was able to
connect to a cellphone tower at a specific moment in time. Because cellphones do
not always connect to the cell tower that is physically closest but to the one with the
strongest signal, this may or may not be probative of the phone’s location.122 The
potential risks of overvaluing a cell tower’s location relative to the phone’s actual
location can be illustrated by the dangerous problems resulting from the reliance
on tower-location in developments to the United State’s 911 routing system.123
The 911 system relies on the location of the cell towers used to place emergency
calls to route callers to nearby dispatch centers. 124 This is essentially the same
principle behind historical CSLI mapping, which hypothesizes a cellphone’s
location based on the tower used to make or receive a call.125 The goal of the 911
system’s use of cell tower location is to route calls to the closest “public safety
answering point (PSAP)”so that emergency services can be dispatched to the caller’s
location as quickly as possible.126 However, because the “location of the cell tower
that handles the call … may be some distance (varying from a few hundred feet to
several miles) from the caller’s location,” a high volume of emergency calls are
routed to the wrong dispatch center (dispatch centers that are closer to the cell
tower than the caller’s actual location). 127 For example, after sustaining a head
injury, a pregnant woman called 911 from a playground in Burlington County, New
Jersey, but the cell tower she connected to routed her to a dispatch center in

2019), https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2019/fakta-om-tiltagi-teledatasagen [https://perma.cc/J362-WR44]; “Lesson 7” in https://www.justitsministeriet.dk
/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2019/faktaark_-_tiltag.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2020) [https://perma.cc/C234-NW8V] (translated in Danish).
121

See Minor, supra note 18, at 37.
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Location-Based Routing for Wireless 911 Calls, 33 FCC Rcd. 3238, 1 (Mar. 23, 2018).
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Philadelphia.128 Emergency calls like this are not technically “misrouted,” because
they are correctly routed to PSAPs closest to the tower location that facilitated the
call; rather, the errors occur because the system relies on the fallacy that cellphones
always connect to the nearest cell tower.129
Tower-based routing results in delays in the delivery of emergency response
services, leading to greater injuries and sometimes death. 130 The FCC has
responded to the problem by enacting “Enhanced 911 rules” and new requirements
for wireless carriers.131 It is believed that the FCC’s transition from “tower-based
routing to location-based routing” could improve the reliability of 911 dispatch
routing and save over 10,000 lives per year.132 Critics of the use of historical CSLI
against criminal defendants have pointed to the 911 system as an example of the
unreliability of cell towers to determine location.133 The FCC’s recognition of the
inadequacy of relying on cell towers in determining caller location has given further
weight to the argument that “[a] methodology that has been determined by
independent government agencies not to be able to stake a caller’s life on should not
now be accepted as reliable enough to risk a defendant's liberty.”134
C. Untested Methods of Analysis
In addition to not knowing the reliability of the underlying data in CDRs, the
methodologies used to analyze historical CSLI have only been tested by law
enforcement. 135 This means that there are no known error rates to support the
accuracy of CSLI mapping, software used to analyze historical CSLI, or drive tests.
These methods of interpreting historical CSLI have only been implemented by law
enforcement, the same party who is usually offering the evidence against a criminal
defendant.136 And just as CSLI and CDR data have been “acknowledged as accurate
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by [] courts without any validation or error mitigation,” 137 courts have generally
accepted the methods used to analyze this data merely because they are widely used
by law enforcement.138
A recent study in the U.S. exploring ways to improve accuracy in forensic cell
site analysis recommended both validating the underlying CSLI and CDR data and
set forth a multi-step methodology for analyzing this data. 139 The methodology
combines many of the processes that are often independently relied on by law
enforcement, and it also advises taking additional steps to promote accuracy and
mitigate the errors that can result from inaccurate cellular network records and the
impact of external factors that affect cell signal. 140 The proposed methodology
recommends conducting drive tests, performing a topographic analysis,
researching aggravating events that contribute to cell signal traffic, analyzing
network infrastructure and traffic, researching historical weather conditions,
analyzing network operations and maintenance records, analyzing cell carrier
performance metrics, and researching cellular operating standards.141 The study
found that these steps “resulted in a modified final mapping analysis in
approximately 40% of the cases,” and even more significantly, that it “resulted in a
modified final mapping analysis that impacted the outcome of the case in terms of
the verdict of guilt or innocence in criminal cases or damages award in civil
litigation” in 6% of cases.142
The study also noted that “[a]lthough several specialty software tools purport to
produce accurate analysis results, including mapping generated from CDR/CSLI
evidence, none of the software tools currently perform the discovered evidence
validation and analysis error mitigation methodology.”143 With no other studies
confirming the reliability of traditional CSLI analysis, this study suggests that as
many as 40% of mapping analyses conducted by law enforcement using available
commercial software could have underlying errors. It also suggests that inaccurate
cell site analysis could be contributing to wrongful convictions in many of the tens
137
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Kirkham, supra note 19, at 376; see also Alexander Ransom, FBI Historical Cell Site Analysis, Law
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(Wash. Ct. App. 2018) cert denied, 435 P.3d 266 (Wash. 2019)).
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of thousands of criminal cases where historical CSLI evidence is used each year.
Denmark’s telecommunications scandal again serves as a cautionary tale of
using unvalidated methodologies to produce forensic evidence. It was, in fact, the
discovery of “multiple glitches” in the software police had used to analyze CSLI data
that prompted the country’s moratorium on cellphone location evidence, the review
of thousands of cases, and the discovery of even further flaws in the data and
methodologies police were using. 144 One source of errors occurred where the
“conversion algorithm” that was utilized to sync the geographical coordinates of cell
sites cellular providers used with the ones police used, “was applied twice to some
mobile tower data, which moved the geolocation positions by a couple of hundred
meters.”145 The scandal also revealed that:
The IT system used for converting telecommunications data was developed internally
by the police and maintained by a single employee. Before December 2018, there were
no administrative practices for quality control of the data conversion system, not even
simple checks to ensure the entire data received from mobile service providers had been
properly converted.146

Cellphone forensic experts have said that such errors “are actually quite
common when automated software is used to analyze cellular call detail records
without being verified or validated.” 147 Nevertheless, challenges to unvalidated
mapping software have been rejected by courts.148
I I I . C H A L L E N G I N G T H E A D MI S S I B I L I T Y OF H I S T OR I C A L C S L I E V I D E N C E

The limitations of correlating cellphone location with cell-tower location, the
unknown accuracy of CSLI and CDR data, and the lack of validated and reliable
methodologies to interpret historical CSLI create a dangerous predicament:
untested and unvalidated evidence disguised as scientific and reliable evidence can
make its way to juries in criminal trials. Until the United States is forced to overhaul
the way this data is collected and analyzed as prompted by the Danish
telecommunications scandal, the safeguards against unreliable evidence in the
Federal Rules of Evidence can provide some bases for exclusion or heightened
scrutiny. The following evidentiary issues should be considered when historical
CSLI evidence is introduced against a criminal defendant.
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A. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 – Testimony by Expert Witnesses
Testimony that is based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge” falls within the scope of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 149 Courts are divided as to whether evidence about how
cellphones connect to towers and how historical CSLI is analyzed requires expert
testimony. 150 This means that in some courts, custodians of records for cellular
companies and law enforcement officers – without training in cellular technology
or the validity and reliability of CSLI and CDR data and analysis – can provide lay
testimony about how historical CSLI places a defendant in proximity to a crime
scene. 151 This can result in misleading information and the introduction of
apparently objective, technical information that has not been subject to the
evidentiary standards typically required for expert testimony. Arguably, the line
between what is permissible as lay testimony and what requires expert testimony
should be drawn at “testimony that goes beyond the simple descriptions of cell
phone basics, specifically testimony that purports to pinpoint the general area in
which the cell phone user was located based on historical cellular data, requires
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”152
Rule 702 sets forth the requirements for testimony by expert witnesses.153 The
subparts of the rule and federal caselaw interpreting these requirements provide
guiding factors for courts to use in assessing the reliability and admissibility of
expert testimony.154 Analyzed against these criteria, historical CSLI evidence may
fail to meet the requirements of Rule 702.155
Rule 702(a) specifies that a witness who is qualified by “knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education” may testify if this expertise “will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”156 Individuals who
introduce historical CSLI evidence must be able to explain how cellular systems
149
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operate, how cellphones connect to cell towers, the reliability of the data collected,
and how the CSLI and CDR data was reliably analyzed. Though cellphones are
ubiquitous and the average layperson may understand the basic way cell towers
work, there are many aspects of historical CSLI evidence that are beyond the
average cellphone user’s experience, such as the variability of cell signal, the cellular
network equipment and technology used to generate CDRs, and the methodology
employed in analyzing CSLI and CDR data. Experts who are qualified to testify
about the relationship between historical CSLI and a cellphone’s approximate
location may include electrical engineers 157 and law enforcement agents with
“specialized training” and experience in conducting historical cell site analysis.158
Attorneys should be prepared to challenge the qualifications of witnesses
introducing cellphone location evidence, or to call their own experts to accurately
explain the highly technical and variable aspects of CSLI data and analysis.
Rule 702(b) further requires that an expert’s testimony be “based on
sufficient facts or data.” 159 This suggests that, as a prerequisite to providing
testimony, the underlying data supporting an expert’s opinion must be reliable. As
discussed above, there are no known error rates for the CSLI data contained in
CDRs or cellular network records used in CSLI analysis. 160 Denmark’s
telecommunications scandal and the Adnan Syed case suggest that incorrect data
may form the basis of historical CSLI analysis in some instances. Unless the data
contained in a CDR and its accompanying cellular network records have been
externally validated, any subsequent analysis and testimony is arguably not based
on “sufficient” data.161
Rule 702(c) next requires that the testimony be “the product of reliable
principles and methods.” 162 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
Supreme Court set forth factors for determining “whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [] whether that
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reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”163 These
factors include (1) whether the methodology “can be (and has been) tested”; (2)
whether it “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) what the “known
or potential rate of error” is; and (4) its “general acceptance” within relevant
scientific communities.164
As discussed above165 , the principles and methods used to analyze historical
CSLI have not been tested or validated outside the law enforcement community,
and there is no known error rate for the underlying data or methodologies used. At
least one study166 and the implications of the Danish telecommunications scandal
suggest that unreliable methodologies for data collection and analysis exist.
Currently, historical CSLI analysis is not used or accepted outside the law
enforcement community, but using tower-location to determine physical location
has been acknowledged as problematic by the FCC in its administration of the 911
system.167 The “widespread acceptance” of historical CSLI by the law enforcement
community – the very community offering this evidence – should not be mistaken
for the reliability associated with acceptance by a “relevant scientific community.”168
Although no factor identified in Daubert is dispositive 169 , the current state of
historical CSLI and analysis falls short in each category.170 Until experts test these
methodologies, subject them to further peer review and “the scrutiny of the
scientific community,” and determine the potential error rates of data collection
and analysis 171 , testimony based on CSLI mapping techniques and software is
arguably not the product of “reliable” methods.
Finally, Rule 702(d) requires that the expert “has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”172 Assuming a properly qualified
expert under 702(a) has externally validated the data in a CDR report to meet the
requirements of 702(b), and then employed a reliable methodology to analyze the
CSLI data to meet the requirements of 702(c), an issue under 702(d) may potentially

163

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
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still arise. However, given the current problems with unvalidated CSLI data and
methodologies, proposed cellphone location evidence may not survive challenges
under 702(a)-(c) to warrant further scrutiny under 702(d).
B. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 803(6) – Hearsay and the Exception for
Business Records
Out of court statements, including printed statements and records, are
generally inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as “hearsay.”173
However, CDRs offered as business records are frequently admitted by courts as
an exception to the prohibition against hearsay under Rule 803(6) when “the
underlying data is kept and maintained by a reliable computer program in the
regular course of business.”174 CDRs are essentially computer records175 produced
by cellphone companies for tracking “customer billing, carrier rates, for network
monitoring, and for facility capacity planning.”176 To qualify as a business record
under 803(6), the following conditions must be met:
(a) the record was made at or near the time by - or from information transmitted by someone with knowledge;
(b) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(c) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(d) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified
witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11)or (12) or with a statute
permitting certification; and
(e) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.177
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The rationale for the business records exception is based on “reliability and
need.”178 Because records produced by businesses are regularly checked,
consistently produced, relied upon by businesses, and compiled by employees
whose employment incentivizes their attention to accuracy, these records are
viewed as sufficiently trustworthy to overcome the rule against hearsay.179
Defendants have tried (unsuccessfully) to challenge the admissibility of CDRs
under the business records exception from several angles: objecting to the use of
reports that are not generated during the course of business but in response to a
request from law enforcement180; objecting to a lack of foundation showing how the
records were produced, identified, and stored181; and challenging the reliability or
trustworthiness of the record. 182 Although there is no known error rate or
validation methodology for CSLI data collected by cellular companies or produced
in CDRs, courts have generally treated these records as sufficiently trustworthy.183
However, what is reliable for the business purposes of cellular carriers is not
necessarily reliable for the purpose of proving a defendant’s location in criminal
proceedings.
The fact that CDRs do not constitute hearsay under the business records
exception does not address their admissibility under Rule 702 and Daubert.184 “The
former question goes to reliability of the statements contained therein; the latter
question goes to the scientific reliability of the methodology that forms that basis of
the statements.”185 When offered as evidence for the limited purpose of a cellphone
user’s calls or cellular activity, CDRs may be sufficiently reliable to be admissible
178
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179

Id.

180

See, e.g., People v. Zavala, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 844–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A Sprint records
custodian] also described how he obtains those records in response to legal demands . . . Courts
in other jurisdictions have considered this issue, and the majority of them conclude a printed
compilation of data produced by human query for use at trial falls under the business records
exception provided the underlying data is kept by a reliable computer software program in the
regular course of business.”).
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State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010).
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criminal cases as circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s approximate location . . . [o]ur view
is no different.”) (internal citations omitted); Minor, supra note 18, at 35.
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under the business records exception. 186 But when offered as evidence of a
defendant’s location, CDRs are arguably still not admissible for the reasons
discussed above.
Whenever the business records exception is cited for historical CSLI evidence,
attorneys should be prepared to challenge the scientific reliability under Rule 702
and Daubert, as well as the adequacy of the foundation and authentication of the
evidence. If admitted under the business records exception, attorneys should
consider requesting a limited jury instruction that explains that the data is
admissible only for the limited purpose of suggesting that a phone connected to a
cell tower at a specific time.187 This may then protect against jurors considering
what is only sufficiently reliable to meet the business records exception as
scientifically reliable evidence of a defendant’s physical location.
C. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 901 – Requirement of Authentication
The introduction of historical CSLI evidence also poses an issue for the
evidentiary requirement of authentication.188 Federal Rules of Evidence Rule
901(b) requires the proponent of evidence to “produce evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”189 The rule goes
on to list examples of evidence satisfying the requirement, which includes in
subsection (9) “[e]vidence describing a process or system and showing that it
produces an accurate result.”190 The Advisory Committee Notes to this rule state
that “Example (9) is designed for situations in which the accuracy of a result is
dependent upon a process or system which produces it.”191 The accuracy of CDRs
and historical CSLI evidence clearly depends on the method of analysis used to
produce them. Thus, attorneys should be prepared to raise authentication
challenges to CDRs that are not supported by evidence showing the carrier’s
system produced accurate historical CSLI data and (unlike the Syed case) that the
information in the CDR “is what the proponent claims it is.”192
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D. Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403 – Excluding Relevant Evidence for
Prejudice or Confusion
Since the early 2000s, the “CSI effect” has been described as a phenomenon
influencing jury deliberations in criminal cases.193 In response to the popularity of
true crime and forensic television shows, the CSI effect is believed to “lead[] jurors
to have unrealistic expectations of forensic tests and possibly cause them to
incorrectly weigh the importance of either the absence or presence of forensic
evidence.”194 Though the effect is often cited by prosecutors who believe it creates a
higher standard for the evidence they must demonstrate to yield a conviction, it is
also believed to cause juries to be “more likely to convict based on a
misinterpretation of forensic evidence.”195
Authorities in Denmark cited the potential for jurors to overvalue forensic
cellphone evidence when discovering the data and software flaws undermining the
accuracy of cellphone location evidence. 196 Prior to the telecommunications
scandal, cellphone location evidence was widely viewed as “highly accurate” and
given “high significance and value in courtrooms because [it was] considered
almost objective.”197 The likely prejudice and confusion that unvalidated cellphone
location evidence could create caused the country to take significant steps to control
the use of this evidence.198 There is also a risk that American juries may overly weigh
cellphone location evidence as objective and highly accurate forensic evidence in
criminal cases, despite the true accuracy of historical CSLI evidence being unknown
and often overstated,199 and this “objective” evidence being “in fact produced by the
prosecution”200 offering it.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is designed to serve as a gatekeeper to
otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or]
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misleading the jury… .”201 The accuracy of cellphone location evidence is confusing
and not fully understood, and the precision of tower-location data is misleading.202
Despite this, juries who are presented with “forensic” cellphone evidence by
“experts” are likely to view this evidence as highly accurate and objective.203 Thus,
attorneys should be prepared to challenge the admissibility of cellphone location
evidence under 403. Defendants who challenge the admissibility of cellphone
location evidence under 403 should cite to the phenomenon of jurors overvaluing
forensic evidence when arguing that any probative value in determining a
defendant’s general location from historical CSLI is outweighed by the prejudice
that would result from jurors failing to appreciate the lack of validation and
unknown reliability of this evidence, as well as the confusing misconception that
cellphone signals connect to the closest cell tower.204 A defendant’s 403 argument
should also cite the risks inherent to expert testimony which “can be powerful,
misleading, and difficult to evaluate” and thus deserves greater weight when
assessing potential prejudice under 403.205 At the very least, attorneys confronting
cellphone location evidence should proceed with caution as criminal attorneys in
Denmark have been forced to do: “We are probably going to question it as we
normally question a witness or other types of evidence, where we consider
circumstances like who produced the evidence, and why and how.”206
I V . C ON C L U S I ON

Cellphone location evidence has been offered as accurate by law enforcement
and accepted as accurate by courts without any validation or proven reliability.
There are several misconceptions about how cellphone technology works and how
much information can truly be gleaned from historical CSLI data. The limited
review of the methodologies used to collect and analyze cellphone location data and
the 2019 telecommunications scandal in Denmark suggest that the ways law
enforcement and prosecutors use CSLI data does not always produce accurate
evidence of a defendant’s location. And still, cellphone location evidence is used in
201
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tens of thousands of criminal trials each year.207
Although this evidence is widely permitted in criminal trials, the gaping
holes in the sufficiency of the underlying data and reliability of the methodologies
used to analyze historical CSLI create opportunities for evidentiary challenges to
the admissibility of cellphone location evidence. Until the United States is forced to
reckon with the limitations and risks of this data as prompted by the Danish
scandal, challenges under Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 702, 901, and 403 should
be raised to keep what is possibly junk science, and more likely junk evidence, from
being introduced against defendants in criminal trials.
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